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An objective of the St. Gallen workshop on the advisory opinion con-
cerning the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipel-
ago from Mauritius in 1965 was to discuss hidden and so far, untold per-
spectives and dynamics that have framed the Chagossians’ long legal 
struggle to return. In the following I focus on some untold perspectives 
on power and its ability to subvert human rights that have emerged 
within the oral proceedings. The hearings have provided a transformative 
moment for the ICJ, as a court of international law concerned with hu-
man rights and self-determination,1 to continue its work on these issues. 
The interrelated questions from the General Assembly ask the Court to 
provide a legal opinion on whether or not the decolonisation of Mauritius 
was lawfully completed in light of the separation of the Chagos Archipel-
ago from Mauritius. The Court was then asked to opine on the conse-
quences under international law arising from the continued administra-
tion by the UK of the Chagos Archipelago, including with respect to, the 
inability of Mauritius to implement a programme for the resettlement on 
the Chagos Archipelago of its nationals, in particular those of Chagossian 
origin. 
The African Union (AU) has, in a stunning moment of never seen 
before collective action, positioned the case as one that is fundamentally 
aligned to the AU’s mandate and purpose, ‘to safeguard and consolidate 
 
* English qualified solicitor and postdoctoral researcher at Erasmus School of Law 
and the International Institute of Social Studies in the Netherlands.  
1 For an analysis of the ICJ’s record on human rights and self-determination through 
advisory opinions and interstate cases see R Higgins, ‘Human Rights in the International 
Court of Justice’ (2007) 20 Leiden J Intl L 745–751. 
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the hard won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of our states and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms’.2 
By placing questions of decolonisation before the Court, the AU invites 
the Court to mobilise the right to self-determination. This right is perhaps 
the Court’s greatest legal weapon against colonial era injustices which 
continue to prevent people from freely choosing their own path to social, 
economic, cultural and political development. And those questions on 
decolonisation do not appear out of thin air but arise, as argued by Mau-
ritius and its supporters, from rules and principles that were well estab-
lished in United Nations (UN) law by 1965.3 So, Mauritius has asked the 
ICJ to follow a clear line of precedent laid out in the Namibia and Wall 
cases4 that any severance of a territory by an administering power when 
such severance is not reflective of the free and genuine will of the people 
holding the right to self-determination is a breach of that right. That de-
colonisation remains incomplete due to the detachment of the Chagos 
Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 is, for Mauritius, evidenced by on-
going colonial power (the islands remain under the administration of the 
British until such time as they are no longer required for defence pur-
poses) and crucially, the human tragedy of the case evidenced in the de-
sire and ongoing inability of Chagossians to return. This was supported 
through compelling video testimony brought before the judges.5  
Taking this decolonisation lens, Mauritian counsel and the AU have 
invited the Court to view the case as one that transcends the plane of a 
purely bilateral dispute between Mauritius and the United Kingdom and 
 
2 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 
1965 (Request for Advisory Opinion) see <www.icj-cij.org/en/case/169>; Written 
statement of the African Union <www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/169/169-20180301-
WRI-07-00-EN.pdf> 16. 
3 Written statement of the Republic of Mauritius, <www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/169/169-20180301-WRI-05-00-EN.pdf > 189-211; written comments of the 
Republic of Serbia <www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/169/169-20180515-WRI-06-00-
EN.pdf> 30. 
4 Statement of Belize, <www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/169/169-20180130-WRI-
01-00-EN.pdf> 2.20, 2021. 
5 Public sitting held on Monday 3 September 2018 at 10am on the Legal 
Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 
(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations), 
Verbatim Record 72. Legal counsel for Mauritius played a video statement of Madame 
Elysé, which was offered as ‘a statement of impact’, showing ‘what the continuation of 
colonialism really means for real people’.  
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in so doing have transplanted the subject matter of the legal opinion into 
one which belongs to a ‘broader frame of reference’.6 That frame is one 
that touches and concerns the ‘whole world’.7 This is because separating 
the territory of Mauritius prior to independence without the freely ex-
pressed consent of the people, has prevented Mauritius from including 
those Chagossians living in Mauritius at the time of separation from en-
joying a cardinal principle under international law that cannot be set 
aside, the right to self-determination.  
By framing the question in this way the ICJ is invited to discuss the 
case as one that concerns a violation of a fundamental human right to 
self-determination. A right that carries a special corresponding duty on 
the part of all states to enforce this right erga omnes. Crucially, in the oral 
proceedings, that right was contextualized within the factual reality of 
unequal power relations and the continuation of colonialism. The con-
tinued existence of colonialism and its frustrating effects on human 
rights, particularly the ability of ongoing structures of colonialism to im-
pede the social, economic and cultural development of dependent peo-
ples, was a discernible theme that was woven into the oral and written 
submission from Mauritius and its supporters. This is an overdue con-
versation that I have previously had8 in the hope that issues of power, 
ongoing colonialism and the so far peripheral nature of the Chagossians 
human rights will finally take their rightful place within the legal record 
as a means to obtain some legal remedy for the Chagossian community.  
On the point of remedy, the Court could indirectly attribute remedy to 
the community through the following requirements on the UK and Mau-
ritius. First, that the UK completely and speedily withdraw from the Cha-
gos Archipelago. Second that the UK transfer administrative responsibil-
ities to Mauritius. Third, a requirement that the UK and Mauritius coop-
erate to facilitate the urgent resettlement of Mauritian nationals of Cha-
gossian origin in the archipelago in a manner that promotes the eco-
nomic, social and cultural well-being of the community.9 The Court 
could safeguard the implementation of these remedies for the community 
through the creation of a special intergovernmental trust mechanism with 
 
6 Written statement of the African Union (n 2) 31.   
7 Oral Statement of Kenya 11. 
8 K Bhatt, ‘A Post-Colonial Legal Approach to the Chagos case and the (Dis) 
application of Land Rights Norms’ (2018) Intl J Law in Context 1-19. 
9 Drawing from the written statement of Mauritius (n 3) 19-20.  
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the UN acting as trustee on behalf of the Chagossian community as ben-
eficiaries.10 
Frequently lost in the midst of a case that has been adjudicated for 
over twenty years within a state focused legal structure interested in in-
terstate discourses about the rightful owner of the islands, is the human 
rights situation of the Chagossian people and the power structures 
against which they have struggled to find legal remedy. So, whilst the ICJ 
proceedings saw differing views11 on whether the right to self-determina-
tion had crystallised at the key date of dismemberment (8th of November 
1965) into a universally recognised norm of customary international law, 
such dry legal arguments tend to crowd out a bigger conversation around 
power and an international legal system that has, in this case, permitted 
power to determine legal outcomes for so long.   
At the ICJ core legal issues were thoughtfully contextualised through 
the lens of colonisation and power. I wonder whether in 2018, the weight 
of that contextualisation might well be strong enough to provide Chagos-
sians with legal remedy through a legal process that fills in some gaps in 
legal protection. Those gaps emanate from a state focused system that is 
tied to principles of inter-temporal law, is less focused on giving clear 
support to indigenous or nomadic peoples’ rights to land except to the 
extent that any such rights extend authenticity to a state’s claim to sover-
eignty,12 and has so far largely side-lined the plight of non-state actors like 
 
10 I Bantekas, ‘The Emergence of the Intergovernmental Trust in International Law’ 
(2010) 81(1) British YB Intl L 224-228.   
11 The UK government argued that the right had not crystallised into a norm of 
customary international law by the key date of 1965, written statement of the United 
Kingdom, <www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/169/169-20180215-WRI-01-00-EN.pdf>, 
137-138. For a counterview see Belize’s submission extending a thorough history of the 
norm from the 1950s supporting its argument that by the 1960s and certainly by 1965, 
the right of colonised peoples to self-determination was an established part of customary 
international law, Statement of Belize (n 4) 5 
12 So, in Western Sahara nomadic ties to land were considered to the extent they 
provided degrees of authenticity to support the territorial claims of Morocco for example: 
ICJ, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12 and similarly, in Pedra Branca 
the ties of the Orang Laut people of the sea were used to authenticate the territorial ties 
of Malaysia to the disputed islands, ICJ, Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v Singapore) (Pedra 
Branca case) (Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep 12. 
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the Chagossians within judicial mechanisms at the European and domes-
tic levels. The European Court13 has already disregarded the human 
rights of the Chagossian people when it declared the case inadmissible 
on the grounds that each of the islanders had accepted the paltry sum of 
£ 2976 paid by the British government. The case ultimately saw the Cha-
gossians plunged into a human rights black hole14 in which national laws 
and international treaties for the protection of human rights do not apply 
to the islands. Claims have also been vacated at the domestic level even 
when legal arguments for return have engaged fundamental sources of 
law like the Magna Carta right to abode.15 When those rights have been 
used as a prospective sword by a group of Chagossians to make a legal 
claim to return, remarkably they have been relegated from fundamental 
to important16 rights capable of extinguishment for economic and mili-
tary reasons without legal precedent of use for exiling a settled popula-
tion.17 Judges in the UK House of Lords found that a changed macro-
political field and sufficient public interest justified the 2004 order in 
council to set aside the territory for defence purposes resulting in no per-
son having the right of abode in the territory. Those macro political con-
siderations specifically related to powerful state focused geopolitical con-
cerns like the changed security situation after 9/11, the prohibitive finan-
cial and ecological costs of resettlement in the atolls and the UK’s con-
tinued co-operation with an important ally in maintaining key defence 
installation on Diego Garcia.18  
That these considerations were accepted by judges giving the major-
ity opinion on the policy grounds of sufficient public interest and that the 
rights withdrawn were considered not of practical value to the Chagos-
sians,19 demonstrates the serious and so far largely unquestioned power 
 
13 Chagos Islanders v United Kingdom App no 35622/04 (ECtHR, 11 December 
2012). 
14 PH Sand, ‘Diego Garcia: British–American Legal Black Hole in the Indian 
Ocean?’ (2009) 21(1) J Environmental L 13–137.  
15 R. (On the Application of Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 77.  
16 R. (On the Application of Bancoult) (n 15) 45, 61, 70. 
17 R. (On the Application of Bancoult) (n 15) 157. 
18 R. (On the Application of Bancoult) (n 15) 27, 63, 113, 132. 
19 R. (On the Application of Bancoult) (n 15) 63. 
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dynamics and incentives operating within the case.20 Those incentives 
have muted the visibility of Chagossians’ rights to return to their ancestral 
lands when those legal claims compete with powerful state-focused geo-
political uses for territory, a steady stream of financial lease inducements 
and questionable neoliberal behaviours surrounding the financial costs 
of resettlement. For example, facilitating the original clearance of the is-
lands was a state expropriation of land by the BIOT Commissioner under 
the Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes (Private Treaty) Ordinance 
No. 2 1967. The eviction of the Chagossians has been legally facilitated 
through the repeated and overzealous use of a legitimate but extreme 
form of power, the royal prerogative. The defining characteristic of the 
prerogative is that its exercise does not require the approval of Parlia-
ment or any form of consultation or debate.21 Whilst the UK government 
has, on numerous occasions including during the oral proceedings, ex-
pressed its deep regret for the way the Chagossians have been treated, 
admitting a callous disregard for their interests,22 the Chagossians’ ability 
to obtain fair legal outcomes embedded within the rule of law has been 
visibly dimmed from the legal record.   
Despite the numerous legal attempts made by Chagossians to mobi-
lise and implement their human rights those rights have been side-lined 
when they interfaced with powerful state geopolitical and neoliberal in-
terests. That these dynamics and neoliberal behaviours have not been 
questioned enough for how they distance Chagossians claims to return to 
the islands and debilitate the Chagossians attempts to find legal remedies 
through a fair, clear and predictable rule of law, is a characteristic of the 
case. Against this context, the questions posed to the Court within the 
oral proceedings have permitted the human rights effects of the eviction 
and the inability of the Chagossians to be resettled, to be fully interro-
gated in a Court of law and crucially for those questions to be viewed 
through a lens of power asymmetry, ongoing colonisation and dubious 
neoliberal tropes surrounding development.   
 
20 Although some highly charged minority legal opinions were delivered within the 
House of Lords bemoaning the cynical governmental policy towards the islands that 
treated them as ‘bare land’ to be cleared for macro political considerations.  
21 T Poole, ‘United Kingdom: The Royal Prerogative’ (2010) 8 Intl J Constitutional 
L 146. 
22 Written statement of the United Kingdom <www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/169/169-20180514-WRI-01-00-EN.pdf> para 4.3. 
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Interventions by Mauritius and its supporters have prompted the 
Court to look at the ways through which power has and continues to dic-
tate legal outcomes. The possibility brought up on numerous occasions 
during the arbitration award23 of the underlying presence of oil, gas and 
mineral resources within the Indian Ocean sea bed was subtly raised by 
the AU in its submissions on the self-determination point. Specifically, 
the AU made mention to UNGA Resolution 180324 and its specific refer-
ence to the permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources as 
being a basic constituent of the right to self-determination.25 This refer-
ence to natural resources might prompt the Court to think about the real 
prospects of a large scale extractive initiative and sitting behind this, a gov-
ernment that has expropriated land through a 1967 ordinance and evicted 
a settled population without their free, prior and genuine consent in viola-
tion of their right to development and self-determination. The motivating 
factors behind which are perhaps to enjoy regular income streams, and to 
retain control over territory through a dubious military base project which 
would facilitate a larger financial prize in the form of future mineral rights 
lurking beneath the Indian ocean. The Court might even consider that as-
pects of this fact pattern are representative of an ongoing colonial mission 
that is incompatible with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter.  
This line of analysis was also raised within Cyprus’s oral submission. 
Itself a former British colony with two parts of its territory retained by 
the British for sole use as a military base, Cyprus discussed the im-
portance of examining self-determination in light of modern day reali-
ties26 that continue to subvert and obscure ongoing manifestations of co-
lonialism through attaching a different label of security and defence pur-
poses. Cyprus’s understanding of the self-determination norm is one that 
transcends a superficial fact pattern of colonisation and is in keeping with 
the expansive and evolutionary nature of the norm, far reaching enough 
to apply not only to situations of decolonisation but to ongoing situations 
of alien subjugation, domination or exploitation, whatever label might 
 
23 PCA, In the matter of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration before an 
arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea between the Republic of Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, Decision by the Arbitrators (18 March 2015). 
24 UNGA Res 1803 (XVII) (14 December 1962). 
25 Written statement of the African Union (n 2) 102.   
26 Oral Statement of Cyprus, paras 4 and 5. 
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attach to them.27 The entire Chagos debacle is one such fact pattern. 
Likewise, Kenya’s submission supported arguments around foreign mil-
itary bases28 being fundamentally incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the UN and of UNGA Resolution 151429 on 
decolonisation given their ability to partially or totally disrupt the na-
tional unity and territorial integrity of colonial territories and their lasting 
implication for international peace and security.30  Kenya also impressed 
on the Court the realities of unequal power, what it means to emerge 
from a period of lengthy colonial domination and how unreasonable it 
would be to expect a dominated country to immediately confront its co-
lonial power after 150 years of rule. Against this background it would be 
wrong of a former colonial power to treat Mauritius’s actions as reflecting 
consent for the dismemberment of territory.31 Kenya makes a persuasive 
case asking the Court to understand the human and legal tragedy of the 
Chagossians as one formed from ongoing colonial power games. Through 
these arguments Kenya and its supporters request that the Court rectify 
the injustices of the Chagos case through the rule of law.  
It remains to be seen whether the ICJ will provide a legal opinion that 
answers the specific questions put forward by the General Assembly re-
garding the legal consequences of an incomplete decolonisation process 
in this case. By discharging its legal functions, the Court can play a role 
in correcting prior injustices by reaffirming the right to self-determina-
tion as a non-negotiable rule of customary international law that in 2018 
is strong enough to redress ongoing colonial power asymmetries through 
a rule of law that cannot be held hostage to the changing fortunes of pol-
itics and economics. Unlike commercial transactions where legal opin-
ions are provided only for the benefit of the contracting parties and are 
made subject to a range of assumptions and qualifications, there can be 
no qualifications to a legal opinion dealing with a right of this multilateral 
nature.  Whether the ICJ takes up this baton remains to be seen but there 
is no doubt that it has been placed on a compelling trajectory to do so.  
 
27 Oral Statement of Cyprus (n 26) para 8.  
28 Kenya specifically referred to UNGA Res 2165 (XXI) (8 December 1966) on the 
elimination of foreign military basis in the Countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
29 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
UNGA Res 1514 (XV) (14 Dec 1960) (adopted by 89 votes to none; 9 abstentions). 
30 Oral Statement of Kenya (n 7) 29. 
31 Oral Statement of Kenya (n 7) 44. 
